DECLASSIFIED U.S. STATE DEPT NOTES PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO WHY THE PHILIPPINES HAD TO GO IT ALONE ON SABAH CLAIM BACK IN THE 60s

To complete the 'historical circle' of why we possibly are having the most difficult time claiming Sabah back, here's another anecdote that everyone must hear, courtesy of Ms Yolanda Ortega Stern

DECLASSIFIED U.S. STATE DEPT NOTES PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO WHY PH HAD TO GO IT ALONE ON SABAH CLAIM BACK IN THE 60s

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DECLASSIFIED U.S. STATE DEPT NOTES PROVIDE INSIGHT INTO WHY THE PHILIPPINES HAD TO GO IT ALONE ON SABAH CLAIM BACK IN THE 60s 

From the Archives Re: Sabah

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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968VOLUME XXVI, INDONESIA;MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE; PHILIPPINES, DOCUMENT 367

367. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1

Washington, May 20, 1968.

SUBJECT

The Sabah Dispute and ASEANDiscussion:As you will recall, at the luncheon May 9, Foreign Minister Thanat raised the question of the Philippine-Malaysian dispute over Sabah and his concern that the dispute may disrupt the ASEAN ministerial meeting in August. Thanat plans to reason with both parties before the bilateral talks on Sabah open in Bangkok June 17. He would like us to persuade President Marcos to cool off the quarrel. We did not at the time so inform Thanat, but we have told the Filipinos informally, when they mentioned the issue, that we thought they should quiet the matter. (See Manila 8618 and State 136076 attached at Tab B.)2

After giving the matter further thought, and discussing it with the Country Directors in EA, I believe that we should continue to avoid active intervention in the Sabah dispute, and to avoid initiating discussions on this issue with any of the interested governments. In arriving at this conclusion, I considered the following points:

(1) Seriousness of Present Impasse—We expect the Bangkok talks on Sabah to fail, with mutual recriminations. Malaysia intends to reject the Philippine claim outright and to refuse a second round of talks, even if (according to one senior Malaysian official) the Philippines react by breaking diplomatic relations again. The Malaysians also plan to stage a military demonstration in Sabah while the bilateral talks are going on. On the Philippine side, President Marcos is reported to have reversed the moderate line urged by Foreign Secretary Ramos, and the Department of Foreign Affairs is now taking a “second hard look” at the relative priorities of regional cooperation and the Sabah claim.

(2) Sabah as a Southeast Asian Problem—We have told both the Filipinos and the Malaysians that we consider Sabah primarily a problem which they will have to work out for themselves. Other members of ASEAN, working separately or jointly, may be able to help them work out a face-saving compromise, or to persuade them at least to try to contain the dispute in order to minimize the damage to regional cooperation. I believe that advice or pressure from outside powers, however well-intended, would only weaken the sense of responsibility of ASEAN members for handling their own affairs, and that at this point, we can best encourage the development of ASEAN by standing aside and letting the member states decide for themselves how to deal with the potential threat posed by the Sabah dispute.

(3) U.S.-Philippine Relations and Philippines in Southeast Asia—I believe that it would be unwise especially for the U.S. to attempt to guide or influence the Philippines on this issue. Such a move would encourage the Filipinos' tendency to draw us into their affairs and then to consider us responsible for the situation. It would also reinforce the view held by other Southeast Asian nations that the Philippine Government cannot be dealt with as a responsible Government, but must be approached through Uncle Sam, who will keep them in line. If the Philippines is to play a responsible role in Southeast Asian affairs, Fililpino leaders must learn to conduct their affairs without guidance from us, and to bear the consequences of their mistakes.

The attached telegram (Tab A)3 would instruct Bangkok to follow up the luncheon conversation of May 9 with Thanat with a fuller discussion of the Sabah issue, and to outline an appropriate portion of the reasoning I have given above. Other addressees would be authorized to draw on the message in discussions with interested officials, but not to raise the Sabah question independently.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached telegram to Bangkok concerning the Sabah dispute.

1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 18 MALAYSIA. Secret. Drafted by Ruth A. McLendon (EA/PHL) and cleared by EA, EA/PHL and in draft with EA/IND, EA/MS, EA/TB, and EA/RA.

2 Both attached but neither printed.

3 The draft telegram is attached, but is not printed. According to a handwritten note, Rusk approved its transmission and it was sent on May 21 at 12:30 p.m.

(NB: Credit to Yolanda Ortega Stern for the Philippine Sabah Claim Forum for the research.)

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My thoughts off the cuff:

I have come across some similar documents -- declassified State Dept documents but not as clear as this. I suppose these notes were written during the SEATO meeting in Bangok (Lyndon Johnson was there)

WE WERE "SOLD"! What makes me think that the Sabah claim was "sold"? Because of this portion in the State Dept report:

"(3) U.S.-Philippine Relations and Philippines in Southeast Asia—I believe that it would be unwise especially for the U.S. to attempt to guide or influence the Philippines on this issue. Such a move would encourage the Filipinos' tendency to draw us into their affairs and then to consider us responsible for the situation. It would also reinforce the view held by other Southeast Asian nations that the Philippine Government cannot be dealt with as a responsible Government, but must be approached through Uncle Sam, who will keep them in line. If the Philippines is to play a responsible role in Southeast Asian affairs, Fililpino leaders must learn to conduct their affairs without guidance from us, and to bear the consequences of their mistakes."

"Fililpino leaders must learn to conduct their affairs without guidance from us" but at the same time, the US always expected us to toe the line when it came to their desiderata. Extraordinary! They really wanted us on leash -- to bark when they said so and to heel at command and at the same time, we were expected to 'act independently.' Simply simply extraordinary! 

This how-to-handle-the-Philippines policy'must have been the same stand since 1963 when the Philippines filed a protest with the UN about the planned Malaysia Federation incorporating Sabah and Sarawak. We did not received any backing for our protest with the UN from our American allies. There's been no evidence that they did. 

My question has now been half answered, i.e., "Why did not the Americans want to help us pursue the Sabah claim?" My most generous thought is that they couldn't be bothered -- but that's only part of the answer... There is a tactical or perhaps, more serious strategical reason and that's what I would like to find out. I say this because Britain helped their former colony Malaya Federation (which is now Malaysia Federation following the 1963 annexation of Sabah and Sarawak) -- America could have done the same for us. Really they could have. 

At the same time, the State Dept or the CIA must have been aware of the Marcos preparations for Oplan Merdeka, the first physical attempt by the Philippines to re-take North Borneo or Sabah, a plan that he had begun to put up in earnest in 1967 or a year before this note was released...

They [the Americans] could not have ignored that... Were they just simply turning a blind eye but at the same time knew that they would step in and stop Marcos one way or the other if he went ahead and carried with his plans to "invade" Sabah?

A relative of mine who had been a legal adviser to one of the presidents and who later on became defence undersecretary for another Philippine president had informed me that in early 1968, the US had agreed to transfer vessels to the Philippines which the US knew -- no way they wouldn't have known because they were already aware of Oplan Merdeka somehow -- would be used to ferry troops across Sabah... At the last minute when Jabidah Massacre was exposed, the vessels were turned back and sailed back to Vietnam.

These are not conjenctures. They were events that happened prior to the failed Philippine re-taking of Sabah or the denunciation of the covert operation made famous by media as the Jabidah Massacre. But the big question remains: Why did America not support our Sabah claim bid? 

By Anne de Bretagne For the Philippine Sabah Claim Forum and For the Defenders of the Philippine Sabah and Spratly Claims 26 Sept 2012 

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POSTED ON http://defenders-philippine-sovereignty.blogspot.com/2012/12/declassified-us-state-dept-notes.html

In picture: US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the man who sealed the fate of the Philippine Sabah claim.